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Abstract
This paper tests whether the academic achievement is a significant
determinant of the employment status in the Italian labor market: are the
new entrepreneurs selected from the top or bottom end of the graduates
ability distribution? Is the cream of the graduate crop pulled into self-
employment by the higher expected earnings or are the individuals with
lower degree score pushed into entrepreneurship by poor alternatives?
Our data show a strong negative relation between academic achievement
and self-employment status, i.e. we assess the skimming of the best
graduates into wage and salary work.
JEL - Classification: J24, J31
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21 Introduction
This paper tests whether the academic achievement is a significant determi-
nant of the employment status: are the new entrepreneurs selected from the
top or bottom end of the graduates ability distribution? Is the cream (the
part that rises to the top) of the graduate crop pulled into self-employment
by the higher expected earnings or are the individuals with lower degree score
pushed into entrepreneurship by poor alternatives (Dennis (1996))?
Previous research on the empirical relation between education and en-
trepreneurship find an insignificant selection effect. A meta-analysis of 94
academic studies conducted by van der Sluis, van Praag, and Vijverberg (2003)
measures the impact of schooling on self-employment and draws the conclu-
sion that the effect of education on entrepreneurship is neither positive nor
negative.1
In this paper we provide additional empirical evidence for the Italian labor
market. In particular, our data show a strong negative relation between aca-
demic achievement and self-employment status, i. e. we assess the skimming
of the best graduates into wage and salary work.
This paper has two advantages over previous research. First, in Italy
self-employment represents a clear alternative to wage and salary employment
because the share of self-employed workers over total employed is above 28 per-
cent.2 Moreover, the self-employment rate among graduate workers is about
26 percent, the highest rate in Europe and more than double the share in Den-
mark, France, Spain, Portugal, Sweden, Netherlands and Finland (Eurostat
(2002).
Second, our data allow to shift the focus of the relationship between school-
ing and employment status from the highest level of education completed to
more specific measurements like as degree scores and completion speed by ma-
jors. To our knowledge, ability as measured by degree performance has rarely
been used in previous analyzes of self-employment. As far as we know, only
3Dolton and Makepeace (1990) consider degree class and A level score. They
draw the conclusion that these variables have no significant role to play in
their analysis.
2 Related Literature
We focus our analysis on two questions: 1) Why do some people choose self-
employment over wage employment? 2) Why do the best Italian graduates
prefer wage-employment? The theoretical literature on entrepreneurship ar-
gues that those who choose self-employment are all individuals for whom the
use of their ability in entrepreneurial functions guarantees earnings higher
than they would otherwise receive (Lucas (1978))3. Therefore people in self-
employment are related to both entrepreneurial ability and outside options.
Rees and Shah (1986) suggest that education enhances individual managerial
ability and increases the probability of choosing self-employment because more
educated workers tend to be better informed and more efficient at assessing
entrepreneurial opportunities. However, this positive effect may be dominated
by an opposite (negative) effect of education on entrepreneurship selection. In
fact, higher educational performances might generate better outside options
in paid employment, and thus depress the likelihood of self-employment as the
preferred choice (de Wit (1993)).
As suggested by the referees, we produce separate gender specific estimates
because several studies show that female and male entrepreneurs differ in
many respects. For example, female entrepreneurs have been found to be
more educated either in the U.K. (Cowling and Taylor (2001)) and in Italy
(Eurostat (2007)).4 Scherer, Brodzinski, and Wiebe (1990) report that males
have a higher preference for entrepreneurship than females. Scott (1986) finds
that women choose entrepreneurship in order to achieve a balance between
career and personal life/family. Buttner and Moore (1997) highlight the desire
of women to pursue entrepreneurship because they experience gender related
4barriers to their career advancement in paid employment.
Our data show that the degree score is higher for employees than it is
for the self-employed (both for males and females). This preference of the
best graduates towards paid work may be due either to the attractiveness of
a career prospect5 or to the attractiveness of employment protection.6
The debate on the European labor market regulation has emphasized the
negative effect of employment protection legislation on the firms’ firing costs
(Schettkat (1997)). In contrast, the results presented here highlight a positive
effect deriving to firms from the stability of the employment relationship: it
induces job-seekers to compete for vacancies, so that firms can apply selection
criteria to screen the best of them (Clotfelter (1996)).
Thus the employment protection legislation may have two consequences on
self-employment. First, it may make self-employment an attractive option for
low-ability graduates who have failed to pass firms’ selection processes, partic-
ularly if employers attempt to circumvent the negative effect of employment
protection legislation by contracting-out work to self-employed contractors
(OECD (1999)).7 Second, our data show that job protection may induce the
best graduates to prefer dependent employment, dissuading the ”cream of the
crop” from taking up other options as the self-employment status.
3 Data and Methodology
Data
Our data are derived from the Survey on Labor Market Transitions of
University Graduates carried out in 2004 by the Italian National Statistical
Office. The Survey is the result of interviewing Italians who graduated from
university in 2001 three years after graduation. The retrospective informa-
tion gathered allows us to analyze both academic performance (final degree
grades) and initial entry into the labor market.8 The data contain information
on the educational curriculum, the occupational status, the student’s family
5background and personal characteristics.
In particular, the principal variables contained in the data set can be di-
vided into the following five main groups. (i) University Career and High
School Background : including, kind of high school attended, high school mark,
other education, university, subject, duration, degree score, accommodation,
work during university, post graduate studies,(ii)Work Experience: including,
experience in actual work, experience, type of work, net monthly wage,(iii)
Work Search: including, kind of work desired, willingness to work abroad,
preference over time table, minimum net monthly wage required, (iv) Fam-
ily Information: including, parents’ work, parents’ education level, brothers
and/or sisters, (v) Personal Characteristics: including, date of birth, sex,
marital status, children, country of domicile, country of birth, residence.
Following much of the existing empirical literature, the sample used in
this study was constructed in the following way. We exclude individuals that
work in the sector of primary production, in line with Rees and Shah (1986),
Johansson (2000) and van der Sluis, van Praag, and Vijverberg (2003). We
omit individuals who graduated in the field of medicine as their career path
is very different from that of other graduates.9 Finally, the sample consists
of full-time workers only.10 We end up with a sample of 9902 individuals of
which 5203 are male and 4699 are female. For men, 1065 are self-employed
and 4138 employees, a sample self-employment rate of about 20%. For women,
643 are self-employed and 4056 employees, a sample self-employment rate of
about 14%. Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for the sample used.
Figure 1 shows the empirical distribution of earnings for self-employed and
employees.11 We observe that the distribution of self-employment earnings
exhibits greater dispersion and is more skewed than the employees distribution
for both males and females.
Further evidence of the differences in self-employment and employee net
monthly earnings distributions is shown in tables 1 and 2. We observe that
6while male self-employed earn more on average than employees do, female
self-employed earn less. The standard deviation of the income of the self-
employed is also two times higher than for the employees for both males and
females. Table 2 shows the distribution of the net monthly earning by job
status. Both table 2 and figure 1 are consistent with the view that the self-
employment typically is a more risky option because the increased changes of
higher earnings are balanced to some extent by the increased changes of low
earnings.
There is now clear evidence in the literature that self-employed workers
have more variable and unequal incomes than employees do (Parker, Belghitar,
and Barmby (2005)). As an example, all the studies on the distribution of self-
employment income explored by Parker (1997) show that the self-employed
are over-represented in both the upper and lower tails of the overall income
distribution. However, we observe that in our sample two opposite grounds
may explain the self-employed income distribution. From one side we consider
only graduate workers. Indeed, the education may reduce the variation in the
self-employment earning as stressed by Rees and Shah (1986). From the other
side we take into account a first entry in the job market, i.e. the earnings are
sampled at an early stage of the graduate’s career. In particular, this sampling
may thick the left tail of the self-employed earning distribution where low
earnings may merely reflect the initial costs of establishing a business.
In the following, we attempt to show the influence of the individual ability
on the choice to become self-employed. To this end, we measure the unob-
servable ability by means of the degree performance. The degree performance
takes into account both the final degree mark and the speed12 at which stu-
dents complete their academic career. Both information are gathered in what
we call the ”educational performance”: edperf .
edperf =
dscore
1 + 0.10× years (1)
7where dscore is the degree mark plus the laude or highest honors when it
occurs. The number of years in excess (years) used to get the degree is even-
tually corrected for those having carried out military service during university
years. Obviously, the degree scores have been normalized to take into account
the different marking scale for each faculty.13
Figure 2 shows the cumulative distribution functions of the educational
performance (edperf ) for employee and self-employed graduates. Our data
clearly show a first order stochastic dominance of employees with respect to
self-employed.14 Hence, when we only consider the effect of the academic
achievement on the self-employed status we find a clear and strong negative
relation for both males and females. In the following, we investigate whether
this relation holds also when we control for other variables as individual char-
acteristics (for instance family background) and the potential earning obtained
from working in each sector.
Methodology
We investigate the effect of the educational performance on the choice be-
tween self-employment and paid-employment by means of the model of Rees
and Shah (1986) and similar to the models estimated by Dolton and Make-
peace (1990), Bernhardt (1994), Taylor (1996) and Johansson (2000). The
motivation of the model, which is a standard selection model of the employ-
ment status decision, is that the self-employed have a comparative advantage
of working in that sector. An individual chooses to work in the self-employed
sector if his utility is higher than in the paid-employed sector. Formally, an
individual i will choose to be self-employed if:
U sei − U ei ≡ α0(ln(Y sei )− ln(Y ei )) + α1Xi + ²i > 0
where the superscripts se and e refer to the self-employment and employed
sector, respectively. The difference in utility obtained in each sector, i.e. the
choice of sector, depends on non-pecuniary factors such as social background,
8risk attitudes, family responsibilities and education (the variables included in
X),15, and on the earnings differential in the two sectors, Y se and Y e, respec-
tively. Because the earnings of an individual is only observed in the sector
which he or she works, a sample selection problem may arise. This problem
is overcome by estimating earnings equations for the self-employed and the
paid employed augmented with the appropriate sample selection corrections
(Table 4). In particular, the self-employed (employees) have a comparative
advantage in their chosen employment status if the estimated coefficient for
the selection effect in the earnings equation is negative (positive).(See Rees
and Shah (1986)).
Hence, we first estimate a reduced form probit model (Table 5) for the
choice of being self-employed and then we make use of this estimation result
to eventually correct the earning regression estimation for the sample selection
(Heckman (1979) two-step procedure). Last, we estimate the structural form
probit (Table 5) which includes as regressors also the difference in the natural
logarithm of the earnings in the two sectors, (ln(Y sei )− ln(Y ei )).
The structural probit equation is identified by means of variables that
appear in the structural probit but not in the earnings equations. These
variables should affect the choice to become self-employed/employees but not
earnings.16 We identify the structural probit by omitting the dummy variable
Children from the earnings equations. In fact, while there is no reason to
expect that being married should affect earnings, the number of children has
been found in several studies,17 to be correlated with being self-employed.
At the same time, the identification of the structural probit equation re-
lies also on the exclusion of variables which affect the selection decision only
through the earnings equations. Following Dolton and Makepeace (1990) and
Johansson (2000) we drop from the structural probit equation the education
level dummies of the individual, i.e. the dummy Qualification which assumes
a value of 1 whether the graduate workers has attempted further qualifica-
9tion after graduation. We therefore assume that the education level dummies
of the individual affects the choice to be self-employed or not through earn-
ings effects only. Further, we exclude from the structural probit equation the
dummy variable Work Experience which indicates whether the individual has
started his actual work before the graduation or, more in general, was working
before he graduated.
4 Results
Rees and Shah (1986) and Dolton and Makepeace (1990) find no statisti-
cally significant role for the predicted earnings differential in the estimates of
the self-employment decision. In contrast with these results, our data suggest
that the earnings distribution provides incentives to be self-employed (for both
males and females) in line with the findings of Fujii and Hawley (1991), Bern-
hardt (1994), Taylor (1996), Johansson (2000) and Georgellis and Wall (2005).
The coefficient of the predicted earnings difference used in the structural pro-
bit model is positive and significant (see table 5). This implies that the more
the predicted self-employment (employees) earnings exceed the predicted em-
ployees (self-employed) earnings for a given individual, the more likely that
individual is to be self-employed (employee).
We turn now to analyze the influence of the direct effect of ability (as mea-
sured by the educational performance) on the entrepreneurial choice. Dolton
and Makepeace (1990) find that ability, measured by A-level and degree perfor-
mance, has no significant role to play. In contrast with this result, we find that
the educational performance raises the likelihood to become employee (row 2
of the structural probit equation in table 5), that is we find evidence that high
ability graduates (both males and females) are drawn to wage-employment by
something other than better earnings. This may be due to the attractiveness
of employment protection legislation on young graduates. This result is not
surprising for young women assessing high Italian standards of employment
10
protection as maternity and parental leaves. Conversely, this result may not
be taken as granted for male graduates. Our interpretation is reinforced by
the empirical evidence on the transition between self-employed and employees
in the Italian labor market. Rosti and Chelli (2005) show that subordinate
employment is perceived by woman as a place of arrival from which they
rarely move. This suggests that female self-employment is more transitory
than male self-employment as shown also by Cowling and Taylor (2001) for
the U.K. labor market.
Further, we observe that the educational performance has a positive and
significant impact only on the employees earnings (row 3 of table 4) for both
males and females.18 This result seems to be consistent with the presence
of a signalling effect of the best graduates in wage-employment. Moreover,
our empirical results offer some support for the strong screening hypothesis
(SSH) which states that schooling is merely a signal of the productivity for
employers. A widely used test to verify the screening hypothesis is to compare
the returns to educational performance for the self-employed (the unscreened
control group) and employees (the screened group). The idea is that self-
employed have no need to signal inherent ability and therefore any return they
make to education represent a true return to human capital investments. If
it turns out that the returns to educational performance for the self-employed
are insignificant and the returns to educational performance are significantly
positive for employees this would give support for the SSH (see Brown and
Sessions (1998), Brown and Sessions (1999), Castagnetti, Chelli, and Rosti
(2005), Garc´ıa-Mainar and Montuenga-Go´mez (2005) and Brown and Sessions
(2006)).
Table 4 show the estimation results for the earnings’ equation in both al-
ternative employment status. Both equations are corrected for possible sample
selection bias.
The sample selection terms, lambda, obtained from the reduced form pro-
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bit, show that there is a positive (negative) selection bias for the observed
earnings in self-employment (wage employment) of both genders. This means
that earnings of those who choose wage employment are significantly lower
than earnings they would have obtained as self-employed. Although the cau-
tion of Dolton and Makepeace (1987a) who show that no unambiguous inter-
pretation can be placed on the sign of a sample selection term, this evidence
may confirm our belief that individuals prefer a job entitled with full rights to
social security to self-employed.
Last, turning to the structural probit equation, we observe that the family
size variable (Children) is significant in explaining the choice to become self-
employed. The presence of children reduces the incidence of self-employment
for both men and women. This is consistent with the desire to reduce the
riskiness of ones income (as shown in fig. 1) by seeking out employment in
the waged sector. Conversely, Dolton and Makepeace (1987b) and Taylor
(1996) find that children positively influence the probability of female self-
employment due to the need to balance work and child care commitments.
Cowling and Taylor (2001) suggest that the rigidity of waged employment in
terms of fixed hours and contractual obligations is less suited to mothers of
young children, but in Italy job protection results much more attractive than
the flexibility of self-employment.
5 Conclusion
The strong empirical evidence that employees exhibit higher educational per-
formance than self-employed led us to check the robustness of this fact and to
investigate the causes of the entrepreneurial choice.
A graduate individual will choose wage employment instead of self-employment
when the benefit expected from pursuing a career as employee is higher than
that of becoming an entrepreneur. Monetary earnings are one of the most
important benefit of employment but the choice of a career also depends on
12
preferences and personal attitudes such as specific abilities. As an individual’s
earnings are only observed in the sector in which he works, sample selection
problems may arise. Following Rees and Shah (1986) and Dolton and Make-
peace (1990) we separate the direct effect of ability on the entrepreneurial
choice from the indirect effect of this characteristic through the expected earn-
ings differential.
Our data show that both relative income and ability have a positive role
on the choice between self-employment and wage employment. In particular,
the probability of being an employee depends positively on the educational
performance. While we expect this result for young women because of the
high benefits of maternity in wage employment, we surprisingly find the same
evidence for males. That is, a steady job entitled with full rights to social
security (insurance for sickness and unemployment periods) could be more
attractive for young males than an entrepreneurial career.
We draw the conclusion that firms can skim the cream of the Italian gradu-
ate crop and reject low ability individuals pushing them into self-employment,
even if they would have otherwise preferred to work as employees. As a con-
sequence, policies based on increasing the returns from self-employment are
unlikely to encourage the best graduates to become self-employed at the be-
ginning of their careers. However, the nature of our data set means that these
results have to be treated with caution. The graduates are only a short way
into their careers and they could change the choice between wage employment
and self-employment several times during their life work.
Notes
1 For example, Blanchflower (2004) shows that in Europe the probabilities
of being self-employed are lower the more educated an individual is, while the
opposite is true in the US. In Italy, as in the U.S., the probability of being
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self-employed is higher for tertiary educated persons (Eurostat (2007)).
2In Italy the self-employment rate is three times higher than in Denmark
and more than double the share in France, Germany, Sweden, Netherlands,
Austria and Finland (Eurostat (2005)).
3A recent theory formalized in Lazear (2004) and Lazear (2005) posits that
an individual who is innately well versed in a variety of fields, i. e. a Jack-
of-All-Trades, has a high probability of becoming entrepreneur. Consistent
evidence that a balanced skill-mix causally stimulates entrepreneurship is given
in Wagner (2003) on German data. On the contrary, Silva (2006) on Italian
data shows that gathering expertise across various subjects does not increase
the chances of becoming entrepreneur.
4Cowling, Taylor, and Mitchell (2004) also find substantive differences in
job creating capability across gender and education that we cannot verify with
our data set.
5A referee suggests this hypothesis, that we cannot neither confirm nor
reject because our data refers to individuals with a very short career advance-
ment (three years after graduation).
6Traditionally, the Italian standard work contracts have been characterized
by high degree of employment protection, mostly against dismissals. Accord-
ing to the OECD (1999)’s Employment Outlook, Italy ranked first in terms of
strictness of the regulation of permanent contracts during the 1990’s.
7Robson (2003) finds only very limited evidence to support the hypothesis
that stricter employment protection legislation promotes self-employment in
OECD countries.
8The graduate population of 2001 consisted of 155.664 individuals (67.913
males and 87.751 females). The ISTAT survey was stratified on the basis
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of degree course taken, University attended and by the sex of the individual
student. The response rate was about 67.6%, yielding a data-set containing
information on 26.006 graduates.
9After having obtained their degree in medicine, in general the students
carry out a specialist activity which lasts at least three years.
10Due to missing data we can’t reliably build the hourly wage variable.
That’s why we restrict the sample to full-time workers only as Dolton and
Makepeace (1990), Rees and Shah (1986) and Johansson (2000). Following
Rees and Shah (1986) we define the full-time workers as those who worked
more than 30 hours per week.
11The estimate is based on a normal kernel function.
12In the Italian education system, each faculty only sets a minimum number
of years in which to obtain a degree. A consequence is that there is a high
dispersion in the age at which students graduate. The speed of completion of
the academic career is, therefore, together with the final mark, an important
component of the educational performance.
13The final degree score ranges from 66 to 110 (for some Universities the
maximum mark awarded is 100). According to each faculty internal ruling a
laude (distinction) may be assigned to candidates with a 110/110 mark for
recognition of the excellence of their thesis (in this analysis the 110 cum laude
was transformed to 113).
14First-order stochastic dominance is a possible ordering between two stochas-
tic distributions. Let F (x) andM(x) denote the cumulative distribution func-
tions of the educational performance x for female and male students, respec-
tively. F first-order stochastically dominates M if and only if for every possible
educational performance x, F (x) ≤M(x). This means that for every possible
value of x, the probability of getting an educational performance that high is
15
never better in M than in F.
15See Dolton and Makepeace (1990).
16These variables should be uncorrelated with the error terms of the earnings
equation but have a strong effect on selectivity. See Johansson (2000).
17See, for instance Rees and Shah (1986) and Taylor (1996).
18This result is in line with the findings of Dolton and Makepeace (1990),
Fujii and Hawley (1991), Taylor (1996) and Johansson (2000).
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Males Employees Self-employed
Mean Standard deviation Mean Standard deviation
Edperf 83.408 17.171 80.798 16.901
ln earnings 7.182 0.237 7.210 0.459
Father self-employed 0.233 0.372
Industrial Sector 0.361 0.139
Qualification 0.012 0.004
Work Experience 0.607 0.642
Females Employees Self-employed
Mean Standard deviation Mean Standard deviation
Edperf 84.386 17.909 82.722 17.992
ln earnings 7.003 0.265 6.963 0.462
Father self-employed 0.277 0.372
Industrial Sector 0.177 0.075
Qualification 0.011 0.009
Work Experience 0.669 0.633
Industrial Sector: A dummy taking the value of 1 if the graduate is working in the
industrial sector.
Work Experience: A dummy taking the value of 1 if the graduate either was work-
ing during the university or has started the actual work before graduating.
Qualification: A dummy taking the value of 1 if the graduate has obtained a post-
graduated certificate of education.
Table 2: Relative frequency distribution of net monthly earnings by
job status
Males Females
self-employed employees self-employed employees
450 0.18% 0.05% 0.96% 0.25%
600 5.68% 0.23% 12.86% 3.60%
800 7.01% 0.73% 13.02% 5.51%
1000 18.72% 12.27% 26.37% 26.91%
1400 26.26% 57.26% 22.19% 53.15%
1600 17.39% 16.67% 11.58% 6.94%
1700 1.60% 2.56% 1.13% 1.04%
1900 3.02% 3.59% 1.77% 1.02%
2300 11.36% 4.87% 7.07% 1.14%
2500 4.79% 0.85% 1.45% 0.32%
2700 0.35% 0.23% 0.64% 0.00%
3300 3.64% 0.71% 0.96% 0.12%
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Figure 1: Empirical distribution of earnings for employees and self-employed
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Figure 2: Cumulative distribution functions of the educational performance
for employees and self-employed
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